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SPATIAL CLUSTERING OF NGOs: AN EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC 
GEOGRAPHY APPROACH 
Dirk-Jan Koch & Ruerd Ruben 
ABSTRACT 
Strong patterns of concentration characterize the location decisions of development 
NGOs. Since current theories on non-profit location choice tend to neglect such 
tendencies, this article develops an evolutionary economic geography approach to 
non-profit organizations. It focuses on increasing returns to scale, labor mobility and 
path dependence and contextualizes those factors. A survey involving visual ranking 
methods of OECD-based development NGOs and structured field-level interviews 
with local NGOs in the Central African Republic and Tanzania provide original 
empirical data. Statistical methods are used to contrast the divergent experiences in 
the two countries. The article concludes that the increased interest of international 
NGOs in Tanzania and their continued lack of interest in the Central African 
Republic are self-perpetuating processes that explain the concentration of NGOs. 
This concentration may lead to increased efficiency, but reduces the equitable 
distribution of NGO aid and therefore has implications for the attainment of global 
poverty goals.  
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SPATIAL CLUSTERING OF NGOs: AN EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC 
GEOGRAPHY APPROACH 
 
Development aid through international NGOs is unequally distributed. Figure 1 shows 
the concentration of development NGO activities, based on data from 61 of the 
world’s largest development NGOs.2 The map displays per capita NGO expenditure 
(in Euros) in developing countries. Countries shown in a darker shade receive greater 
NGO aid per capita. As the scale indicates, it is readily visible that certain countries 
receive more than 20 times as much aid per capita, such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Nicaragua, than others, such as Yemen, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Pakistan an the 
Central African Republic. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of NGO aid in 2005 (Euro per capita)  
 
Source: Koch, 2008 
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 Organizations that matched the following criteria were included in this sample: 1) have an 
annual budget of more than 10 million USD, 2) spend less than 50% on humanitarian aid, 3) 
be primarily active in developing countries. Organizations that were included were for 
instance World Vision, Care, Plan and Oxfam.  
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The budget of these 61 of the largest international development NGOs was 6.9 billion 
Euro in 2005. Of this budget, 4.3 billion Euro was spent in developing countries. 
These organizations were active in an average of 44 countries. Developing counties 
received on average 30.4 million Euro from NGOs in the sample. The level of NGO 
aid differs substantially between countries. Countries such as Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda receive amounts in excess of 100 million 
Euro annually, while countries such as Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Yemen receive less 
than ten million Euro annually.  
This article explores geographic decisions and clustering of 61 international 
NGOs, with a special focus on two particular countries: Tanzania and The Central 
African Republic. The Central African Republic (CAR) is an extremely poor, 
landlocked country, where 75 percent of the population of four million live below the 
poverty line. Tanzania, meanwhile, is a coastal country with a population of about 38 
million, a quarter of which (11 million) live below the poverty line. Accordingly, one 
would expect Tanzania to receive greater support from international development 
NGOs - in equivalent terms, about three times as much. The real difference, however, 
is much greater. 61 of the world’s largest non-governmental development 
organizations spend only around €1 million Euro a year in the CAR , compared with 
around €70 million Euro a year in Tanzania. The CAR is thus an example of a ‘donor 
orphan’. This is an undesirable situation since the CAR ranked 172nd out of 177 
countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2006a). More alarming 
still is the fall in social indicators during the decade. Life expectancy has fallen 
dramatically from 49 years in 1988 to 42.7 in 2003 (UNDP, 2007), and the situation 
in the education and health-care sector is bleak (World Bank, 2007). The CAR is 
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unlikely to reach the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2006b). For Tanzania, 
meanwhile, the figures tell a different story: the Human Development Index rose from 
0.45 in 1985 to 0.52 in 2005.  
Current non-profit location theories cannot provide an adequate explanation 
for this disproportionate distribution of aid. These theories either consider non-profit 
organizations as altruistic organizations that address the needs of the population, or as 
entities that make geographic choices based on budget-maximization, or as a 
combination of both. These theories virtually all rely on a neo-classical supply 
(funding) and demand (need) framework (Zeller et al., 2001; Smith and Wiest, 2005; 
Fruttero and Gauri, 2005; Nancy and Yontcheva, 2006), and fail to provide an 
adequate explanation of the real levels of NGO aid concentration observed.  They do 
not take recent developments in economic geography, among which evolutionary 
economic geography,  adequately into consideration.  
This article proposes a non-profit agency location theory: an evolutionary 
economic geography approach to non-profit organizations. The approach is better able 
to clarify the existing patterns of geographic concentration amongst non-profit 
organizations, particularly development NGOs. The research uses core concepts from 
evolutionary economic geography. It focuses on increasing returns, labor mobility and 
path dependence, while paying due attention to contextual factors (Boschma and 
Frenken, 2003; Arthur; 1995). This article suggests that many of these economic 
geography elements, which are normally used to explain concentration of for-profit 
companies, can also be set to work to understand concentration among non-profit 
organizations.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, the article 
commences by outlining the contours of the proposed evolutionary economic 
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geography approach to non-profit organizations, drawing extensively on the 
evolutionary economic geography approach. This approach is then applied to two case 
studies that represent two contrasting outcomes in terms of NGO concentration: 
Tanzania and the CAR. Tanzania, and in particular the Arusha region – which is the 
focus of this research - is characterized by a large-scale expansion in the foreign-
funded NGO sector. No such expansion has been observed in the CAR. These two 
contrasting cases enable an in-depth analysis of determinants of NGO concentration. 
Finally, the article discusses how the approach can be refined in light of the case 
studies. 
 
AN EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY APPROACH TO NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
In literature on the geography of voluntary and non-profit organizations, many have 
noted that one of the salient characteristics is its unequal spatial coverage (e.g. 
Bryson, et al., 2002; (Fyfe and Milligan, 2003); Sakabe and Eloundou-Enyegue, 2006; 
Milligan, 2007;). When non-profit location theories are applied in an attempt to 
explain such inequalities in aid distribution among non-profit organizations, the most 
commonly used framework relies on supply and demand analysis (Wolch and Geiger, 
1983; Weisbrod, 1988; Wolch, 1999; Gronbjerg and Paarlberg, 2001; Barr and 
Fafchamps, 2005). Supply factors often include financial and human resources that 
are available to non-profit organizations in certain locations, while demand is 
reflected in the level of poverty among the local population (e.g. Bielefeld, 2000; 
Beckfield, 2003; Taylor, 2004; Dreher et al., 2007). With some exceptions (e.g. 
Bielefeld and Murdoch 2004), these analyses are static and cross-sectional in nature 
and do not pay attention to dynamic processes at work in non-profit clustering.  Most 
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studies, for instance, correlate indicators of needs with indicators of NGO presence 
and simply conclude that NGOs succeed (or not) in reaching the poorest segments. 
These studies refrain from explaining current patterns of inequality. 
The economic geography discipline basically deals with the distribution of 
economic activity across space (Clark et al.,; 2000). Since the uneven distribution of 
one set of economic actors,  non-profit agencies,  is the phenomenon that this article 
seeks to explain it is a logical step to rely on economic geography literature. However, 
a severe methodenstreit has been raging within economic geography over the last 
decades (Hudson, 2003; Lagendijk, 2003; Markusen, 2003a ; Markusen, 2003b; Peck, 
2003; Martin, 1999).  Extending insights from ‘economic geography’ to the non-profit 
domain involves much more than just ‘copy-pasting’ an unequivocal and coherent 
body of economic geography theory. A theoretically well-founded economic 
geography approach to non-profit actors requires explicit choices with respect to 
underlying assumptions, the importance of contextual factors and the 
conceptualization of time (e.g. whether it is mainly a static or dynamic analysis). 
Moreover, such an approach needs to provide guidance into which methodologies can 
be used to demonstrate the validity of the theoretical concepts. Boschma and Frenken 
(2006) identify three approaches to economic geography: a neo-classical; an 
institutional and an evolutionary approach. This article develops an evolutionary 
economic geography approach, while benefiting in some aspects from the strengths of 
the institutional approach to compensate for certain relative weaknesses of a strict 
evolutionary line.  
 The evolutionary economic geography approach which has been developed by 
Boschma and Frenken (2006) provides the theoretical tools for a dynamic analysis of 
concentration. The evolutionary economic geography approach is consistent with 
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evolutionary thinking in other disciplines, as it explains a current state of affairs from 
its history. The authors state that:  
 
‘The current state of affairs cannot be derived from current conditions only, 
since the current state of affairs has emerged from and has been constrained 
by previous states of affairs. Evolutionary theory deals with path dependent 
processes, in which previous events affect the probability of future events to 
occur. In this view, small events can have large and long-lasting effects due 
to self-reinforcing processes.’  
 
There are various reasons why the concentration of NGOs might be a research topic 
that is amenable to an evolutionary economic geography analysis. Foremost, other 
statistical work on the geographic choices of international NGOs has shown that past 
geographic choices of international NGOs were a clear determinant of current choices 
of international NGOs (Koch and Loman, 2008). However, how this path dependence 
exactly works does not become clear from those panel analyses. An evolutionary 
economic geography might thus provide interesting insights in how historical 
developments have an impact on current concentration tendencies.  Secondly, an 
evolutionary approach can also moves beyond descriptive case studies as it proposes 
more formalised ways of theory testing. Since there are already various ethnographic 
and qualitative case studies available on the geographic choices of NGOs, which 
provide convincing examples of the importance of path dependence (e.g. Bebbington 
2004), the evolutionary approach can stimulate a more systematic way of analyzing 
the assumed self-reinforcing patterns. Due to the relative novelty of this evolutionary 
economic geography approach, an articulated critique on it has not yet surfaced 
(Martin & Sunley, 2006).  
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Nevertheless, there are certain still relative underdeveloped aspects of the 
evolutionary economic geography sub discipline, which can be compensated by 
integrating some strong elements of an institutional economic geography approach. 
For instance, one of the preferred methods of many evolutionary economic geography 
studies is formalized modeling. Since the concentration of non-profit actors has hardly 
been empirically researched at all, it appears more suitable to first gather more insight 
in potential drivers of this concentration, before turning to abstract models. That being 
said, also within evolutionary economic geography an increased use of surveys and 
questionnaires can be noted (e.g. Boschma & Weterings; Wenting et al, 2008). Also 
the focus of the evolutionary approach on how organizational routines impact the 
competitiveness of firms (and how spin-offs copy those routines from mothers firms) 
does not tally very well with the focus of this research. The competitiveness of 
individual firms is not the prime focus of this research. Instead it centers on the 
mechanisms that enable emergence of non-profit clusters as a whole, and analyzes 
therefore complementarities between organizations within a cluster, support 
organizations and how contextual factors contribute to the emergence of clusters. 
Therefore, it appears advisable, especially from a methodological point of view, to 
also draw on some of the strengths of the institutional economic geography approach, 
notably the Italian industrial district approach.  
The institutional economic geography approach, notably the industrial district 
approach, can contribute to an analysis of the geographic choices of NGOs. Whilst the 
industrial district approach hardly produces testable hypotheses, studies in this 
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tradition share some methodological strengths which can enrich the understanding of 
non-profit clusters.3  
Firstly, the industrial district approach is rooted in detailed empirical work on 
specific regions and stresses the social, cultural and political foundations of local 
sector growth and cluster formation. The approach pays due attention. to cluster 
effects, such as tacit knowledge spill-overs and joint collective efficiencies (e.g. 
Schmitz, 2000; Visser, 1999). The industrial district ‘method’ is thus particular useful 
in analyzing contextual factors that have assisted or hindered the development of 
certain regions and sectors. Recent literature on the growth of NGO sectors suggests 
that contextual factors are indeed of clear importance (Mitlin et al., 2006). Large-scale 
cross-country regression analysis has also been used to analyze geographic choices of 
international NGOs (e.g. Koch et al., 2008).  This approach was helpful in 
establishing that the international NGO sector can be characterized by strong 
concentration. It provided, however, less insight into the mechanisms provoking these 
concentration tendencies. The foci of studies within the industrial district tradition, 
with its clear contextual analysis, can make these mechanisms more explicit.  
Secondly, the industrial district approach looks beyond firms (or in our case 
NGOs) when analyzing concentration processes. It includes the role of other 
institutions, such as universities, professional associations, umbrella organizations and 
relations between them. Such a broad approach appears essential as earlier research 
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 Another reason to also make use of the industrial district approach is that the composition of 
the researched NGO sectors bears resemblances to those analyzed by the industrial district 
approach. Sforzi (2000) highlights that an industrial district is constituted by a set of small 
independent specialized organisms in different phases of the same production process. As 
recent inventarisation of NGO sectors in developing countries make clear (Barr and 
Fafchamps, 2006; Fruttero and Gauri, 2005) that the NGO sector also consists of many 
different small actors, that are all engaged in different aspects of the aid delivery process. The 
NGO sector is less characterized by vertically integrated supply chains but relies more on 
dense networks and consequently a post-Fordist approach appears well suited. 
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on the clustering of NGOs has demonstrated that there are strong complementarities 
between NGOs and other economic and political actors (e.g. Laan, 2007). By 
broadening the focus beyond the prime actors of interest the research, we prevent that 
other actors become mere contingencies (cf. Markusen, 1999). 
 There are several weaknesses of the institutional approach (to which the 
industrial district belongs), which explains also why this research takes evolutionary 
economic geography as the main starting point instead. These criticisms come, among 
others, from the proponents of the other traditions, notably the new-geographical 
economics approach (Krugman; 1998b) and the evolutionary geography approach 
(Boschma and Frenken, 2006), but also by less outspoken adherents of one particular 
approach (Markusen, 1999; Grabher 2003). Three main concerns are voiced against 
an institutional approach. Firstly, it is argued that numerous case studies of the 
institutionalists have become so specific that too little attention has been paid to the 
potential generality of the findings, as well as to factors outside the specific case that 
may have impact on its results (Markusen, 2003). Secondly, another weakness that 
critics point out is that contributions in this realm are often not tested systematically 
(Krugman, 1998b). A third criticism relates to its still rather static ways of analyzing 
concentrations. Conversely, in an evolutionary framework, the analysis focuses on the 
degree to which institutions are flexible and responsive to changes. Institutional 
differences between regions or nations are then part of that what needs to be 
explained, as institutions co-develop with processes of industrial dynamics and 
technological innovation.  
 There are also various arguments against using the new economic geography 
approach to explain the concentration of non profit organizations. While this approach 
provides interesting insights into the clustering of economic actors, three reasons 
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render it not fully suitable to explain concentration of non-profit actors. Firstly, one of 
the underlying assumptions of this approach is the profit maximization of economic 
actors, which appears rather problematic when applying it to non-profit actors. 
Secondly, one of the main determinants of concentration in those models is transport 
costs, while these appear relatively unimportant for NGO location choices. Transports 
costs do play a major role in the decisions of international NGOs that are mainly 
involved in financial and knowledge transfers. They transfer funds to local 
organizations, in exchange for which local organizations engage in development 
activities sur place. Lastly, in the end new economic geography applies a classic 
market-oriented demand and supply framework, albeit with other assumptions 
regarding competition and returns to investment. However, various studies regarding 
international aid point out that it can hardly be considered as a market, since supply 
considerations dominate and feedback mechanisms are largely absent. (Easterly, 
2002; Rogerson, 2004) 
 Therefore,  to explain the drivers of concentration of international NGOs, an 
approach that draws most on evolutionary economic geography appears best suited. 
As explained, in this research also some of the strengths of the institutional economic 
geography approach will be taken into consideration, notably its focus on contextual 
factors and on other actors (than just the actors that are the prime focus of the 
research).  
In the proposed evolutionary economic geography of non-profit organizations 
three main theoretical constructs can be identified: increasing returns, labor mobility 
and path dependence. These three elements surface virtually always as drivers of 
concentration in the relevant literature (e.g. Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Sforzi, 2001; 
Antonelli  2000 & 1994; Keeble, 1999).  Interestingly, different terms are used by 
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authors for virtually similar concepts. For example, whereas some authors use the 
term increasing returns to scale (Sforzi; 2002) and others agglomeration economies 
(Bielefeld and Murdoch, 2004) and pecuniary externalities (Antonelli; 2000), they all 
imply that average production costs go down in case of geographic concentration. The 
three concepts that are further used in this article, can be considered as a common 
analytical core that permits to understand the main drivers at the recipient country 
level for spatial concentration of NGO activities. Traditionally, an evolutionary 
economic geography approach might focus exclusively on increasing returns to scale 
and path dependence (Boschma & Frenken, 2003; Arhur, 1994). Yet, for reasons 
explained in detail below, in the case of NGOs, ‘labor mobility’ deserves special 
attention, as especially international staff are highly mobile and contributors to 
concentration. We will first discuss the relevance of each the concepts and then 
provide an empirical illustration. 
 
Increasing returns to scale 
Increasing returns to scale is one of the key factors which lead to concentration 
(Bellandi; 2003). Increasing returns to scale emerge from two types of economies of 
scale: internal (within an organization) and external (between organizations). Internal 
economies of scale arise when an organization can achieve more of its aims when 
clustering its activities. In this respect, for NGOs that work with field offices, it 
becomes efficient to reduce the number of countries where they operate. The 
investment and overhead costs involved in setting up a new base in a new country can 
be reduced by hiring another program officer in a country where the organization is 
already present.   
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External economies of scale arise when a group of organizations can achieve 
more of their aims when they combine their activities. Economic geographers show 
that a decrease in average costs, for instance because of cost sharing and cheaper 
inputs, stimulates organizations to search location close to each other (Bielefeld and 
Murdoch, 2004).  
 
Labor mobility 
Labor mobility contributes in two ways to concentration of NGOs; (1) qualified labor 
tends to move towards incipient concentrations since salaries and living conditions are 
better and (2) labor tends to be more mobile between organizations within incipient 
concentrations. Both of these labor mobility effects positively impact concentration 
tendencies in the long term. 
The mobility of international NGO staff contributes to concentration of NGOs. 
Labor mobility depends on the flexibility of workers to move from one region to 
another. The factors driving people to migrate to another region are related to the 
expectation of receiving a higher real wage or a better living standard (Brakman & 
Garretsen, 2003). If real wages (or quality of life) become higher in a region, some 
part of the labor force is likely to move. The movement of (inter)national NGO staff 
from one aid ‘hotspot’ to another, be it Kosovo, East-Timor or Sri Lanka, illustrates 
that they are highly mobile.4 The movement of international labor is not without 
consequences. International staff can transfer skills that are considered indispensable 
for the NGO sector, such as writing log frame-proposals or negotiating funds with 
head offices. These skills increase the chance that local organizations will be able to 
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 Local staff are most mobile within the same country, as they may be restrained by visa and 
education requirements, for example. 
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attract more funding (Townsend et al., 2002; Wallace, 2000). International NGO staff 
bring the network to reach the international donors. In summary, the presence of 
international staff can lead to further concentration of NGO activity. International aid 
staff prefers to work in more advanced cities where already many other expatriates are 
present, setting in motion a pattern of cumulative causation (Collier, 2007).  
A second reason why labor mobility can lead to further NGO concentration is 
the movement of personnel between organizations. Personnel bring the skills they 
have acquired in one organization to another organization. This movement creates 
knowledge spillover, also called learning effects. The labor mobility among local 
organizations leads to a broadening and deepening of the skill-base of workers and 
facilitates the exchange of tacit knowledge (Saxeenian, 1994; Maskell & Malmberg; 
1995). This may enhance their organizational capacity, thereby triggering the interest 
of foreign donors and enhancing concentration.5  
 
Path dependence 
A path-dependent process or system is one whose outcome evolves as a consequence 
of the process’s or system’s own history (Martin & Sunley, 2006). Different forms of 
path dependence can be distinguished: the dynamic increasing returns effect; the 
technological lock-in effect; and the institutional hysteresis effect (ibid). Since the 
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 One could argue that this aspect of labor mobility should fall under the category of 
increasing returns to scale (cf. Arthur, 1994), after all the presence of better trained personnel 
reduces personnel search costs and drives marginal costs down in a cluster. Labour mobility 
was nevertheless retained as a separate category since the labour mobility processes within 
the international NGO sector are extremely important, and arguably more so than in the 
international for-profit sector. International NGOs largely depend on expatriates to fill top-
levels positions in local subsidiaries of their organisations. Whilst for the majority of 
international firms most jobs are still within the home-country of the firm, this is not the case 
for international NGOs. Most multinational firms in the for profit sector work with 
independent subcontracts in developing countries, with mostly local staff. In international 
NGOs the dominant model is the subsidiary model, in which local divisions of large 
international NGOs are established in which international staff fill the top-level positions.  
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increasing returns effect has already been discussed above, and technological lock-in 
effect is somewhat less applicable for NGO sectors, this discussion focuses on 
institutional hysteresis.6 Institutional hysteresis is ‘the tendency for formal and 
informal institutions, social arrangements and cultural forms to be self-reproducing 
over time, in part through the very systems of socio-economic action they engender 
and serve to support and stabilize’ (Martin & Sunley, 2006: 400). There are various 
angles for analyzing this institutional hysteresis type of path dependence. This article 
focuses on the effects of self-reinforcing networks of international NGO staff and the 
importance of professional capacity building organizations, as several other authors 
have shown the importance of these elements (see below).  
Research regarding the location decisions of NGOs at the sub-national level by 
Bebbington (2004) suggests that networks and institutions both underlie and precede 
the existence of agency choice. It is claimed that personal contacts of relevant officers 
are of key importance and these personal contacts are not accidental, but have a great 
deal to do with the institutions, social networks and histories within which they are 
embedded. Informal and social networks shape the decisions of NGOs, and they tend 
to reinforce themselves easily, leading to exclusion and marginalization.7 An 
empirical analysis of Fafchamps and Owens (2006) corroborates these theories as 
they find that successes of local NGOs in attracting grants from international donors 
depend mostly on network effects.  
It is not only networks, but also the effects of past investments on current 
levels of professionalism within organizations that enhance path dependence, and thus 
stimulate the process of concentration. International capacity-building organizations 
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 The technological lock-in effect is less applicable since NGO aid is not a highly specialized 
sector, in which past technological decisions create points of no return.  
7
 This is in line with Granovetter’s (1985) view on the effects of interpersonal networks on economic 
activity. 
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will target regions where a local NGO sector is already emerging prefer to set up local 
offices there. Such capacity-building organizations contribute to the ‘institutional 
thickness’ of Amin and Thrift (1995). They argue that supporting institutions, such as 
training institutes and professional associations, can make a substantial contribution to 
the economic development of a region. If capacity-building organizations are 
successful, local civil society can present itself as a stronger entity to international 
donors. International donors may consequently increase their funding to local 
organizations in this region, thereby contributing to further concentration.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Selection of the case studies   
Data on spending by 61 of the world’s leading international NGOs has been collected. 
It appears that 37 of these organizations are present in Tanzania and that they spent 68 
million Euro there in 2005. Tanzania is not an extreme case; international NGOs 
spend in total about 5,05 Euro per poor in this country. Tanzania falls in the middle 
category in terms of concentration (see Figure 1). It is comparable to countries such as 
Nepal, Senegal and Ecuador. Yet, also within Tanzania there is actually a fairly high 
degree of concentration. Particular regions are overrepresented and commentators 
have criticized organizations for their neglect of the poorest and most remote parts of 
the country (The Express, in Mercer 2003). The Arusha region was selected for this 
research, since a large concentration of NGO activity has taken place there. Research 
on the allocation of foreign aid to civil society organizations in Tanzania shows that 
almost 20% of foreign-funded NGOs are active in this region, although only 4% of 
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the country’s population lives there (Mercer 2003; May and Magongo 2005; Devdir 
2007).  
The Central African Republic, conversely, is unpopular. Of the 61 NGOs in 
the sample, only four are active in the CAR, and they spent about 1.2 million Euro in 
2005, which equals 0.40 Euro on a per poor basis. Even though the CAR is not an 
extreme case in terms of neglect by NGOs either, it belongs to the countries that 
receive least on a per capita basis.  
Various practical reasons have led to the decision to compare specific 
elements of a country (Central African Republic) with a region (the Arusha region of 
Tanzania). The sheer number of NGOs in Tanzania, and the desire to map a region 
where a real take-off of the local NGO sector has taken place were paramount to this 
decision.8  
 
 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the remarkable different growth paths from 1997 to 
2007. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: International NGO involvement in CAR and the Arusha Region of 
Tanzania  
                                               
8
 The most important caveat is thus that Northern NGOs gave their opinion about the whole of 
Tanzania, while the local field research only covered the Arusha region. Hence, there is a 
high likelihood that the opinions of Northern NGOs on Tanzania are based on their 
experiences in the Arusha region - after all this is the region in which they are most involved - 
biases are likely to be small. Yet, the situation of NGOs in Arusha is not fully representative 
of the rest of Tanzania; the NGO sector in the Arusha region is likely to be more developed. 
Thus, if there is a bias in the opinion of respondents regarding, for instance, the organizational 
capacity in Tanzania, it is likely to be a negative one 
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  Central African Republic  Arusha region, Tanzania  
   Inhabitants: 3.7 million  Inhabitants: 1.3 million 
  1997 2002 2007 1996 2001 2006 
International NGOs with > 1 local grantee* 5 5 6 1 6 9 
International NGOs present 7 7 6 4 10 14 
Number of international NGO donors per local 
organization 
0.7 0.8 1.3 1,3 1,7 2,7 
Average percentage of budget that is foreign 
funded** 
74% 66% 76% 64% 65% 72% 
Average budget of foreign funded organization 
(in 2005 thousand Euros, real values) 
151 99 119 58 106 149 
Total NGO inflows (in millions Euro, real 
values) 
2.412 1.961 3.075 887 2.546 4.935 
*The definition of international NGOs applied here is: (1) organization must have an annual budget 
larger than ten million Euro (2) organization must spend more than 50% of its resources on structural 
development aid (3) organization must be independent from the government (4) organization must 
support projects in the concerned region ** N for Tanzania = 47, N for Central African Republic = 45 
Source: Koch, own data. 
 
The information shown in  
 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates the sharp rise of the foreign-funded NGO sector in Arusha region 
of Tanzania and its virtual standstill in the CAR. Whereas the number of international 
donors with more than one grantee and the number of international organizations that 
are physically present in the CAR has remained stable over the last ten years, there 
has been a steep rise of those in the Arusha region. There is more international NGO 
activity in this single region of Tanzania than in the entire CAR, although the latter is 
three times as populous and substantially poorer (UNDP 2006a). For each local 
organization, the number of foreign donors reached 2.7 in Arusha, whilst this was 
only 1.3 in the CAR. Note that this figure already excludes all organizations without 
international funding. The three-fold real-terms increase in the average budget of 
organizations working in Arusha region, in conjunction with increasing levels of 
dependence on foreign donors, exemplifies the sharp increase in the interests of 
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international NGOs in the Arusha region. This is in marked contrast to the 
involvement of international actors in the CAR: though the share of international 
donors in the budget has fluctuated, NGOs in the CAR receive on average less 
currently than a decade ago. The total foreign budget available to NGOs in Arusha 
tripled 6 times over the last ten years. 
 
Methods 
For a better understanding of concentration among NGOs, two research methods were 
employed (1) a Q-questionnaire of 45 OECD-based international development NGOs 
at the level of their headquarters; (2) structured interviews with 92 development 
NGOs with offices in the Arusha region of Tanzania or in the CAR. The Q-
questionnaire provided insight into the determinants of the funding decisions of 
international donors with respect to Tanzania and the CAR, and to what extent they 
rely on determinants that fall within the scope of the evolutionary economic 
geography approach developed in this article. The structured interviews in the Arusha 
region and the CAR with development NGOs provided insight into the level of 
concentration among NGOs in each region, as well as the extent to which 
geographical economic factors are actually relevant. This two-track approach was 
chosen to highlight the interaction between concentration effects in the field and the 
decisions of donors in the headquarters, which may be mutually reinforcing.  
 
The Q-questionnaire of international development NGOs 
The Q-questionnaire is a research method in which respondents are invited to address 
questions by means of relative visual ranking. In this case, they ranked reasons why 
they are (not) active in Tanzania and/or the CAR. The Q-methodology is a means of 
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identifying subjective opinions. The aim of the Q-methodology is to collect and 
explore the variety of reasons that people construct. The instrumental basis of Q-
methodology is the Q-sort technique that conventionally involves the rank ordering of 
a set of statements (from agree to disagree). It requires participants to sort a number of 
items along a continuum (Cross 2005). In this case, twelve cards displayed arguments 
that could affect decisions on involvement in Tanzania and the CAR. These 
arguments were derived from the evolutionary economic geography approach 
proposed here and from the literature on the geographic choices of NGOs. If 
participants had the impression that cards did not offer all relevant argumentation, 
they could fill in additional cards and rank those as well.  The Q-methodology is an 
appropriate means of discovering the various thought processes involved in making 
geographic choices, as these are often based on complex decision processes without 
clear formal guidelines. The Q-methodology thus allows the diversity of actors and 
factors that influence the decision-making process to be taken into account. 45% of 
the 100 largest international NGOs that were invited to participate did so.  
 
Structured interviews with NGOs based in Tanzania and the Central African 
Republic 
The researchers conducted interviews with managers of NGOs based in both 
countries. The criteria for being interviewed were: (1) independence from the 
government (2) non-profit base; (2) foreign-funded (3) executing development 
projects in the region/country (4) having an office in the region/country. The 
organizations could be either local, national or international in scope.  This resulted in 
a list of 72 potential organizations in the Arusha region, of which 47 were 
interviewed. Composing a list of organizations that matched the criterion ‘foreign-
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funded’ proved to be harder in the CAR, since more organizations did not have any 
foreign funding. Eventually, a list of 45 organizations was composed, which 
comprised all organizations that had at least a structural relationship with foreign 
donors.   
This research relies on two methods applied in two cases, which does not 
suffice to confirm the circular causation hypothesis of the economic geography.  To 
establish whether an increase in interest among foreign donors in one country has 
changed the local setting to such an extent that consequently more foreign donors are 
coming to that country, requires at least four measuring points: (a) the opinions of 
donors prior to increased involvement of donors (b) the local situation with respect to 
NGOs prior to increased international involvement (c) the local situation after this 
involvement and (d) the opinions of donors with increased international involvement. 
This can illustrate whether a mutually reinforcing nexus of expanded interest of 
foreign donors, an improved  aid ‘investment’ climate, and again increased interest of 
foreign donors exist. No systematic data on past attitudes of foreign donors exist and a 
full reconstruction would not be reliable. We therefore opted to retrieve elements (a) 
and (b) from one pre-involvement case study and (c) and (d) from a post-involvement 
case study. This method is thus based on time-for-space substitution, which can be 
considered a classical research method in geography and appropriate for this kind of 
research (Paine, 1985). Yet, it is important to note that not all differences with respect 
to NGOs in the Central African Republic and Tanzania can be automatically ascribed 
to the fact that one is a post-involvement case and the other a pre-involvement one. 
Other factors, which did not necessarily present themselves at the beginning of the 
research period (1996), could have contributed to these divergent experiences as well. 
In the following, we address differences that presented themselves before 1996, and in 
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the discussion it will be indicated whether after 1996 other factors can contribute to 
the diverging paths.  
 
SETTING AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING NGOs 
The data analysis is based on the evolutionary economic geography of non profit 
organizations developed in this article. As explained, this approach takes the social, 
political and historical factors that contribute to concentration into consideration. 
There are important similarities between the two regions, such as the roughly similar 
level of economic development, their degree of ethnic homogeneity, and simultaneous 
backgrounds of colonization and decolonization. In the early 1990s, the number of 
NGOs was higher in the CAR than Tanzania (Fisher, 1998), as twenty years ago, 
virtually no NGO existed in Tanzania at all (Igoe, 2003; Shivji, 2004). This was 
mainly related to the Tanzanian single-party political system that attempted to bring 
all organizations (such as youth and women’s organizations) under the party umbrella 
(Klinken, 2003). Even though there was thus a substantial aid flow to Tanzania, 
relatively little was channelled through NGOs (Hoebink, 1988). The aid that Northern 
NGOs provided went mostly to local (para)-statal agencies (Black, 1992). In the 
CAR, development NGOs existed earlier, many of them linked to Catholic dioceses 
(Cordaid, 2006). These NGOs filled the vacuum of an almost non-existent state 
outside the capital city areas (Oosten and Badjeck, 2006).  
A preliminary analysis of the geographic expenditure of international NGOs 
suggests that there are two major historical determinants that can contribute to an 
explosion of foreign-funded NGOs in one country and the stagnation of this sector in 
another: (a) the colonial heritage and (b) presidential legacy. These are not the only 
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differences between the two countries, but come to the fore as two of the most 
relevant ones when it comes to the choices of international NGOs. 
 Tanzania (during the colonial period known as ‘Tanganyika’) first was a 
German colony, and after the First World War a British trusteeship, under the League 
of Nations and later the United Nations, whilst the Central African Republic was for a 
long time a French overseas territory. The differences between the French and British 
methods of colonization were manifold, yet one important difference relates to the 
role that was assigned to the state during and after colonialism. Whereas France 
exported a state-led development model that dominated its colonies in the post-war 
period, the British Empire had long since been applying a more laissez-faire approach. 
Consequently, the British colonies maintained a far more vibrant (nationalist) civil 
society as they became independent when compared to their French counterparts 
(Ferguson, 2004; Veen, 2002). The aid modalities of the French and the English 
further reinforced the respective roles of the state. Whereas the United Kingdom has 
always - and especially during the last 20 years - supported (local) non-governmental 
organizations, the French government used to deal almost exclusively with the 
governments of their former colonies. It is clear that the ‘associational revolution’ 
(Salomon et al., 2003) manifests itself stronger in the Anglo-Saxon world and this 
clearly had its influence on the geographic location of international NGOs. It is 
illustrative that the ten largest international development NGOs all have their head-
offices in the Anglo-Saxon world, and eight of the ten largest recipients of aid from 
NGOs are former English colonies.  
A second historical difference that still influences the current unequal size of 
the foreign-funded NGO sector relates to the international appeal of the two of the 
most important presidents in the two countries. Bokassa, the president of the CAR 
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from 1966 until 1979, was widely known for crowning himself Emperor in the exact 
same way as Napoleon did. Opponents ousted him in a coup in 1977, but for many 
people Bokassa is still the first thing that comes to their mind when the CAR is 
mentioned. In the Q-questionnaire, 21 per cent of the respondents still spontaneously 
associated the CAR with ‘Bokassa’ before anything else.  Whereas Bokassa is seen as 
personifying all the vices of Africa, such as nepotism and authoritarianism, Nyerere 
represents all its virtues (Meredith 2005). He was president of Tanzania from 1964 to 
1985 and was one of the first African leaders to step down voluntarily. Many 
international NGOs were attracted by his ‘African socialism’, considered a truly 
African alternative to the communist and capitalist model. For 21 per cent of the 
respondents, Nyerere was still the first idea that came to mind when thinking about 
Tanzania. Various NGOs claim that they started their first activities in Tanzania 
because of Nyerere’s personality and development policies. 
 
RESULTS: UNRAVELLING NGO CONCENTRATION 
It is now possible to analyze whether the three concepts that were elaborated in the 
evolutionary economic geography approach of this article can contribute towards 
explaining the tendency of NGOs to concentrate. The results of the Q-methodology 
represent the first step in this analysis (see Table 2). NGO managers were invited to 
select and rank key arguments underlying decisions concerning location. They could 
select five cards that were related to the evolutionary economic geography approach 
to non-profit organizations developed for this article; (a) the capacity of local 
partners, (b) the potential to achieve results, (c) the availability or absence of informal 
networks, (d) the local climate for NGO operations and (e) overhead concerns and 
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spending pressure. These arguments form part of the economic geography theory as 
they involve a clear endogenous element: the economic geography approach predicts 
that these become increasingly relevant arguments when more international NGOs are 
involved in a country.  The other arguments are more exogenous and relate to general 
demand or supply-side issues. Decision makers within NGO headquarters located in 
OECD countries were invited to rank the motivation cards on a continuum between 
‘major argument against involvement’ to ‘major argument in favour of involvement’. 
If economic geography elements are of importance, a significant difference should 
exist between the ranking regarding the CAR and Tanzania. For instance, arguments 
such as ‘local organizational capacity’ are expected to be rated more positively in 
Tanzania compared to the CAR. Following research into the differences between 
clustered and non-clustered regions (Visser 1999), the Mann-Whitney U test was used 
to assess statistical differences between the two countries.9  
 
Table 2: Arguments for (non)-involvement in the CAR and Tanzania1 
Score -2: major argument against involvement  
Score -1: minor argument against involvement 
Score 0 : argument both against and in favour 
Score +1: minor argument in favor of involvement 
Score +2: major argument in favor of involvement 
Central African 
Republic (N=301) 
Tanzania (N=371) Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 N Mean N Mean  
Economic Geography Arguments 
     Local organizational capacity* 17 -0,18 30 0,90 0,008** 
     (Absence of) Local (in)formal network 16 -1,44 9 -0,44 0,042* 
     General NGO climate 15 0,07 22 1,32 0,001** 
     Overhead concerns and spending pressures 15 -1,67 15 -1,53 0,35 
     Possibility to achieve results 17 0,94 32 1,09 0,663 
Other arguments 
     Interest of general public 15 -0,93 13 0,38 0,007** 
     The interest of donors 19 -0,95 26 0,15 0,009** 
     Security situation 15 -0,6 18 0,50 0,002** 
     Image of country 14 0,36 20 1,10 0,053 
                                               
9
 This table includes both respondents that were active and that were not active in the 
respective countries. A breakdown of the table by those that are and those that are not active 
point in the same direction. Please note that categories, such as ‘(absence) of (in)formal 
network’ was thus interpreted differently by those that were and those that were not active in 
the country concerned. 
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     Local corruption 16 -1,00 20 -0,90 0,539 
     Needs in the country 25 1,72 28 1,75 0,868 
     Possibilities for local fundraising 7 0,14 13 0,62 0,461 
Source: Koch, own data. 
Significant differences in bold. ** is significant at 1% level, * is significant at the 5% level.  
1  45 NGOs responded, however not all of them filled in all elements of the Q-questionnaires, which 
explains that N is below 45. There is no reason that the non-respondents could lead to a bias. 
 
The N column in this table represents the number of times that respondents selected 
the card. If organizations did not ‘rank’ the card, this means that this argument is not 
considered when deciding on their (non)-involvement in the country. For instance, 17 
out of 30 respondents (57%) rate ‘local organizational capacity’ in the CAR as a 
relevant argument, and 30 out of 37 rate this for Tanzania (81%). Interestingly, the 
average score that the respondents gave to this argument was -0,18. Scores close to a 
zero imply that the argument worked ‘both against and in favor of involvement’. 
Thirty of the 37 respondents rated the same element for Tanzania, producing an 
average score of 0.9, which is closest to ‘1’ and thus classified as ‘a minor argument 
in favour of involvement’. Moreover, these scores proved to be significantly different 
for the two countries. Another example is the ‘absence of a local (in)-formal 
network’; 16 of the 30 respondents used this reason to explain their (non)-
involvement in the CAR. On average, they scored this argument with -1,44, which 
indicates either a major or a minor argument against involvement. For respondents in 
the Tanzanian case, the absence of a local formal or informal network was not an 
important argument against involvement, as only nine respondents (of 37) ranked it, 
and on average did so closest to a ‘an argument both against and in favor’. This table 
shows that the five economic geography arguments were consistently ranked more 
positively in Tanzania than in the CAR, indicating that economic geography approach 
developed for this paper might contribute to a better understanding of the 
concentration of international NGO aid.  
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This table also clearly shows that there are also other relevant arguments 
which lead international NGOs to opt for Tanzania and neglect the CAR. These 
include the lack of interest of back donors in the CAR and the favourable security 
situation in Tanzania. The large amounts of Official Development Assistance flows to 
Tanzania (approximately 1 billion US dollar annually) in comparison to meager flows 
towards the Central African Republic (about 60 million US dollar) support this. The 
differential rating with respect to security appears is comprehensible. In the Central 
African Republic also an NGO aid worker was shot by rebels in 2007, whilst such 
incidents were not reported for Tanzania (Doctors Without Border, 2008). These 
arguments do appear to reflect different enabling environments for NGOs in Tanzania 
and the Central African Republic. Strikingly, NGOs do not rate the demand side 
argument, needs in the two countries, differently, but do so for supply side arguments, 
such as donor preferences. 
The above results provide a first impression that the location choices of 
international NGOs - just as those made by for-profit firms - could be considered as 
being partly driven by self-reinforcing endogenous motives such as past involvement 
that increases the organizational capacity of local organizations, thereby attracting 
more foreign donors. To enhance the robustness of the finding that Northern NGOs 
include economic geography considerations in country choices, the article now turns 
to findings derived from the structured interviews in the Arusha region and the CAR. 
These will enable to analyze in more depth the drivers towards concentration 
elaborated upon earlier, namely (a) increasing returns to scale; (b) labor mobility and 
(c) path dependence. 
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Increasing returns to scale 
One central factor contributing to concentration is related to the phenomenon known 
as increasing returns to scale. 37% of the respondents had concerns about overhead 
costs which they saw as a major argument against involvement in the CAR, whereas 
this percentage was only 22% in relation to Tanzania. During the field research, 
substantive evidence was found that increasing returns to scale occur to a significantly 
larger degree in Arusha than in the CAR, due to cost-sharing opportunities and 
reduced prices of input purchase. This makes NGOs operating in a concentration, 
such as the Arusha region, more competitive than NGOs operating in a non-
concentrated environment (Porter, 2000; Morosino, 2004; Eifert, et al., 2005). To 
analyze the presence of increasing returns to scale, local organizations were asked 
whether they shared costs with other organizations with respect to (a) cars and 
transport equipment, (b) staff hiring and (c) other (variable) inputs (see Table 3). 
These elements were selected because they often comprise a large share of the 
operational budgets of NGOs. The research analyzed their statistical difference with 
the 2-tailed Mann-Whitney U test (i.e. the non-parametric equivalent of the t-test). In 
all cases, NGOs in Tanzania realize significantly more benefits from cost sharing: 
Tanzanian NGOs more often share cars, staff and other inputs than their counterparts 
in the CAR. 
 
Table 3: Differences in increasing returns to scale– cost sharing 
Are you engaged in sharing the 
following elements with other 
NGOs?’ % refers to + answers 
Central 
African 
Republic 
(N=45) 
Arusha region (N=47) Significance (a-
asymptotic, 2-tail) 
Transport equipment  4% 36% 0,000** 
Staff  13% 42% 0,002** 
Other inputs  2% 45% 0,013* 
Source: Koch, own data. 
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In another procedure for testing whether increasing returns to scale are indeed 
relevant for NGOs, this research explored the differences in prices of inputs. 
Specialized agencies can provide cheaper and better inputs. The extent to which 
NGOs use specialized agencies to provide inputs is therefore likely to influence the 
buying price and delivery quality of inputs. Keeble et al. (1999) have shown that this 
contributes to clustering among for-profit firms in, for instance, the Cambridge region 
in the United Kingdom. For instance, if local NGOs can make use of research 
institutions rather than generating research themselves, they can save money in that 
category. Table 4 provides an overview of the extent to which organizations in 
Tanzania and the CAR make use of external agencies for input provision.  
 
Table 4: Differences in increasing returns to scale– external inputs 
‘Do you make use of external 
suppliers for ..?’ % refers to positive 
answers 
Central African 
Republic (N=45) 
Arusha region (N=47) Significance        
(a-asymptotic, 2-tail) 
 
Accountancy  44% 51% 0,529 
Management consultant  40% 46% 0,588 
Personnel and recruitment 16% 36% 0,025* 
Advertisement 27% 49% 0,029* 
Research 32% 57% 0,012* 
Fundraising 9% 33% 0,007** 
Computer services 60% 72% 0,213 
Printing services 51% 64% 0,220 
Source: Koch, own data. 
 
It can be observed that Tanzanian organizations when compared to their Central 
African counterparts make statistically significant more use of every sort of external 
service providers. In four of the eight cases, these differences are significant. 
Tanzanian NGOs make significantly more use of service providers for fundraising, 
research, personnel affairs and recruitment, and for advertisements.10 Probably, such 
                                               
10
 Looking at the annual reports of the organizations confirms such a picture. Whereas in the 
CAR most annual reports consist of a couple of handwritten pages, in Tanzania full-colour 
and extensive annual reports are available. 
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increasing returns to scale do not only exist between NGOs, but can also become an 
externality for attracting foreign direct investments. Internationally funded tourism 
companies in the Arusha region often make use of the same internet providers, taxi 
companies and security firms as NGOs. By sharing providers, NGOs stimulate the 
market for these services, eventually leading to a general decrease in prices for 
internet services and auditing costs (cf. Keeble, Lawson et al. 1999). Because 
international NGOs can consequently mobilize many inputs locally, operating costs 
are driven down. This is in stark contrast to the situation in the CAR, where the 
notable absence of such a market for inputs leads higher prices for inputs to NGOs.11  
 
Labor mobility 
In the economic geography approach put forward by this article, labor mobility is an 
important determinant of concentration processes. Labor mobility leads to an influx of 
qualified (international) labor towards concentrated areas, which bring with them 
access to more international funds. Similarly, labor mobility among firms and 
organizations in a concentrated area can strengthen the skills-base of the labor force. 
The structured interviews addressed the question of whether NGOs benefited from 
personnel that previously worked at another non-profit organization. In addition, to 
analyze the influx of foreign personnel, the chance that an international staff member 
represented the organization during the reporting events of this research was used as a 
proxy (see  
Table 5). 
                                               
11
 An inter-agency report by major aid agencies on the CAR warns that ‘renting a vehicle for 
one week can cost as much as 3,500 US dollar in the CAR’ (Care International, Norwegian 
Refugee Council et al. 2007). Internet research reveals that this service costs no more than 
500 dollar in Arusha. 
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Table 5: Labor mobility between and to NGOs in CAR  and Tanzania 
 CAR Tanzania Significance (a-
asymptotic, 2-tail) 
Staff previously worked at other NGO 64% (N=45) 79% (N=47) 0,13 
International staff  5,6% (N=71)1 21,1% (N=38) 1 0,015* 
Question to Northern NGO personnel    
Would you like to visit? 56% (N=40) 92% (N=39) 0,002** 
Source: Koch, own data 
1 The refers here to the number of attendees to the reporting events after the two case studies in the two 
countries. Whereas 71 people visited these events in the Central African Republic, this was 38 in 
Tanzania.  
 
These results show that there is indeed more movement of trained personnel amongst 
organizations working in Arusha region compared to those operating in the CAR. 
With respect to international staff, this difference is also significant. The influx of 
foreign personnel appears to be both a cause and an effect of concentration. Arusha 
has always been an attractive place for foreigners to reside. The already high number 
of foreigners provided a network for donors during the early years of development 
assistance. The 1952 census of Tanzania showed that of the 8,000 inhabitants of 
Arusha, fewer than 50% were actually Africans (Finke 2006). This high number of 
foreigners was probably due to geographic factors. Tanzania had traditionally one of 
the lowest mortality rates of settlers in Africa (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). 
Arusha, at an altitude of 1,500 meters, has a temperate climate and no malaria. It is, 
therefore, perhaps unsurprising that more than 90% of respondents from Northern 
NGOs expressed a desire to visit Tanzania, whereas this was less than 60% for the 
CAR. The high number of expatriates have created a physical and social 
infrastructure, which attract further foreigners and NGO activity. 
Concentration can also lead to greater learning effects. It is illustrative to note 
how geographical proximity influences the training opportunities for local personnel 
in Arusha. Almost all interviewees (>90%) know of workshops in which NGOs 
exchange ‘best practices’. More than 70% of the interviewees in Arusha state that 
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their organization has become ‘more innovative’ because of the presence of other 
NGOs. These learning effects can enhance the attractiveness of Tanzania for 
international NGOs. 
Path dependence 
Path dependence can contribute to a further explanation of concentration tendencies. 
The responses to the questionnaire among Northern NGOs enabled the respondents to 
fill in blank cards. Five NGOs stated that ‘they had historically no relationship’ with 
the CAR and were therefore not interested in it. Furthermore, various NGOs justified 
their continued presence in Tanzania by ‘having a decades-long partnership with 
Tanzania’. The past choices of NGOs still have repercussions today (i.e. path 
dependence). Two elements that are highlighted as relevant path dependence 
enhancing mechanisms will be further explored: (a) the role of ‘networks’ and (b) the 
importance of capacity building.   
For many Northern organizations, the absence of a formal or informal network 
was considered an impediment to becoming active in the CAR. To test whether there 
was indeed a significant difference between the informal networks that exist between 
the staff of Northern NGOs in the two countries, respondents were asked whether they 
had ever visited (not in their current capacity) the two countries, or whether they 
knew anybody from there (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Networks of Northern NGO personnel 
 Central African 
Republic (N=40) 
Tanzania (N=39) Significance (a-
asymptotic, 2-tail) 
‘Have you ever been to… (not in your 
present capacity’?) 
3% 67% 0.000*** 
‘Do you know somebody from..?’ 16% 88% 0.000*** 
Do you hear at least regularly 
something about …? 
31% 68% 0,001*** 
Source: Koch, own data. 
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Actually, only 3% of the professional staff of Northern NGOs in this sample had ever 
been to the CAR, compared to Tanzania which two-thirds of the respondents had 
visited. The same holds true for personal informal networks. Whereas 88% of the 
respondents knew a Tanzanian, this was only 16% for the CAR. The exclusion of the 
CAR and its citizens from the informal global network of development professionals 
appears to be  contributing to the perpetuation of its marginal position. The difference 
between the answers on how often they hear something about the two countries is also 
significant.  
Foreign NGOs might entrench path dependence. In the Central African 
Republic, no international organizations (for-profit and non-for-profit) that have local 
capacity building as their prime task are present. In the Arusha region of Tanzania, 
two international organizations (one of them is for-profit, and one non-for-profit) 
focus exclusively on the capacity building of local NGOs. Paradoxically, capacity-
building organizations are present in those regions in Tanzania where already most 
local capacity is present. By focusing on the Arusha region, they are actually further 
strengthening the organizational capacity of organizations in a region that is already 
quite well organized. This was strongly related to access to international funding of 
local NGOs; capacity building is mostly financed by international donors, and as they 
are more present in Arusha, this attracts capacity builders to the area (Laan 2007b). 
This contributes to a further capacity gap between NGOs in the Arusha region and in 
the CAR. 
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DISCUSSION 
This article has sought to develop and empirically test an evolutionary economic 
geography approach to explain the concentration of non-profit agencies. This 
discussion will highlight the limits of this approach, by focusing on three aspects that 
surfaced during the case studies (1) the importance of other contextual factors; (2) the 
restraint needed in applying this approach to concentration at different geographic 
scales; (3) the prudence required if extending this approach automatically to different 
geographic units of the same scale. It is important to be aware that NGO 
concentrations remain the result of multiple factors. Interferences based on just two 
case studies, especially case studies that differ with respect to initial situation and 
contextual trends, can only be modest.  
Not all differences for NGO clustering between the two countries can 
automatically be attributed to the involvement of international NGOs and derived 
concentration effects. There are also other contextual factors that might have 
influenced this process, which either were already present before the time-frame of 
this research or evolved later on. With respect to historical differences, the ‘setting 
section’ showed that both the different colonial heritages and presidential legacies 
mattered. Also during the research time-frame changes emerged between the two 
countries, which could also illuminate on the divergent paths of the two case studies, 
namely: (1) increasing Official Development Assistance to Tanzania and its 
stagnation with respect to the Central African Republic; (2) stronger patterns of 
urbanization in Tanzania; (3) more economic growth in Tanzania, and (4) improving 
governance situation in Tanzania. Koch et al (2008) demonstrated the importance of 
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the choices of backdonors on the NGO location decisions. Firstly, during the period of 
research, official aid allocations rose with approximately 80% for Tanzania (from 600 
million to 1 billion US dollar) and remained stable in the Central African Republic 
(60 million US dollar) (OECD 2007). Thus the increased interest of NGOs with 
Tanzania coincided, probably not incidentally, with increased interest from official 
donors. Secondly, urbanization, linked by Glasius et al. (2004) to the rise of a civil 
society, was much more pronounced in Tanzania than in the Central African Republic 
during the research. This arguably attracted international NGOs looking for strong 
local partners. Thirdly, economic development, which is associated with a rise in local 
non-profit activity (Howard 2003), was negative in the Central African Republic 
during the research period and positive in Tanzania, which probably has had a likely 
reinforcing effect on the reliance of external agencies and for the costs of inputs. 
Fourthly, during the research period Tanzania became slightly more democratic and 
the Central African Republic slightly less (Freedom House, 2006). Since international 
NGOs tend to be more active in more democratic countries this can also have 
contributed to their increased focus on Tanzania (Koch et al, 2008). These four 
above-mentioned factors provided favourable conditions in Tanzania in which the 
local NGO sector could further develop. It is thus important to remind that economic 
geography factors identified in this paper contributed to processes of concentration, 
but are by no means the sole driving forces. Since currently only two case studies 
were analyzed using this approach, more of them are needed to determine the relative 
weight of contextual factors and the economic geography elements elaborated in this 
article. 
A second limitation of the evolutionary economic geography approach 
developed in this paper is that it cannot automatically be applied to concentration at 
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all geographical scales (Martin 1999). The clear patterns of NGO concentration 
observed at the sub-national level leads to the question whether the factors that 
contribute to explanation of concentration at the international level also hold for 
concentration at sub-national level? This research cannot answer this question fully, 
as it did not make such a comparison. Nevertheless, from the field data, three broad 
categories of concentration-enhancing processes can be derived: (a) processes that 
contribute to intra- and inter-country inequality, (b) processes that solely explain 
inter-country inequality and (c) processes that solely clarify intra-country inequality. 
A key factor that affects both intra and inter-country concentrations is labor mobility. 
The fact that qualified staff prefer to work in regions with higher real wages or better 
standards of living holds just as much as at the sub-national as at the international 
level. An example of an argument that holds at the inter-country level but not the 
intra-country level is the colonial tradition. Colonial traditions differ between 
countries and can thus elucidate differences between countries. Lastly, there are also 
factors that contribute to a specific explanation of differences at the sub-national level 
(but that do not hold at the cross-country level). For instance, in regions of a country 
where political opposition is powerful, there is often a vibrant civil society (Clarke 
1998), which could clarify why foreign donors flock to that region. Despite these 
differences, the core elements of the evolutionary economic geography of this article 
(i.e. increasing returns to scale, labor mobility and path dependence) are relevant 
concentration-enhancing effects at different geographical levels. Yet, to arrive at a 
complete picture a multi-level and preferably interactive, approach is required (e.g. 
Beugelsdijk, 2007).  
A third and last reservation relates to the restraint that is needed when 
extending this approach to different geographic units at the same level (countries), 
37 
also known as horizontal generalizations. The economic geography approach 
developed here appears to play a role in illuminating the differences in NGO activity 
in the CAR as compared to Tanzania, but this does not necessarily mean that it can 
also be used to explain differences between Nicaragua and Yemen, or Zambia and 
Guinea. A clear case in point that merits attention is ‘the place dependence of path 
dependence (Markusen, 1996; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Different contexts shape the 
importance and characteristics of path dependence. The effects of religion can be used 
to illustrate this relationship. Many Northern NGOs and their Southern counterparts 
maintain a relationship based on shared religious denominations. There are clear 
indications that religious Northern NGOs have more profound relationships with 
Southern NGOs with a similar religious denomination than with lay partners. This 
makes path dependence stronger in those places where religiously-inspired 
organizations with close links to like-minded organizations in the North are at the 
origin of the concentration. Another example of context-specificity within path-
dependency refers to the kind of aid that NGOs provide. NGO aid with a short time 
horizon and which is distributed by outside actors, such as emergency aid (the so-
called ‘Come ‘N’ GO’s’), usually has fewer long-term effects than NGO aid with a 
longer-term horizon and which is distributed by local immobile actors.12 Therefore, it 
is important to bear in mind that there are clear limits to the horizontal generalization 
of the suggested economic geography to non-profit organizations.  
                                               
12
 It is likely that emergency aid, which international NGOs distributed in Indonesia directly 
after the Tsunami, for example, creates less path dependence than structural aid through local 
partners in Peru, for instance. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has highlighted the unequal spatial distribution of NGO aid and sought to 
provide a theoretical approach to explain this. Traditional theories on the location 
choice of NGOs have focused solely on supply and demand and have therefore been 
unable to explain the current high degree of concentration. This article proposed an 
evolutionary economic geography approach for non-profit organizations. This 
evolutionary economic geography of non-profit organizations assigns a prominent 
role to increasing returns to aid, labor mobility and path dependence, whilst paying 
due attention to contextual factors.  
The article compared two case studies: Tanzania and the Central African 
Republic. It was shown that factors that the abovementioned economic geography 
factors contributed to the agglomeration of NGOs in Tanzania. Factors that explain 
the rise of Silicon Valley, can also be used to understand the rise of “Serengeti 
Valley”. These findings suggest an endogenous growth process among NGOs in 
Tanzania, in particular the Arusha region, in which self-reinforcing processes lead to 
the further concentration of NGOs. The case studies also highlighted various 
contextual factors that played an important role in the concentration and stagnation of 
the involvement of NGOs, indicating clear boundaries to what the economic 
geography factors developed in this article can explain.  
There is clearly a flipside to this concentration. International development 
NGOs spend 60 times more in Tanzania than in the CAR. This is problematic if one 
considers that Tanzania is largely on track towards reaching the Millennium 
Development Goals, while a country such as the CAR is still at the bottom of the 
bottom billion (Collier, 2007). The NGO effectiveness in poverty reduction is thus at 
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stake, and geographical concentration may be counterproductive for reaching the 
MDGs. 
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